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Five Years of Inflation Targeting Without Economic Growth: 
What Should Be Changed? The Case of Russia 
Abstract. The article provides a review of approaches to assessing and analyzing the effectiveness of the interest 
rate and exchange rate policy of the Bank of Russia in the period 2015-2019. Despite the decrease in the rate of 
price growth, inflationary expectations of economic agents remain at a high level. Monetary policy continues to 
be tight. The stability of the exchange rate to external shocks, expected from the introduction of inflation 
targeting and a free floating rate, did not happen. The complex of conditions that have developed due to 
geopolitical factors, low growth rates and the global economic crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic require 
the search for new targets, such as economic growth and exchange rate stability. To maintain the stability of the 
ruble exchange rate, it is recommended to sell foreign exchange reserves accumulated according to the "Budget 
rule" in an equivalent amount; to support the liquidity of banks during periods of an attack on the ruble, it should 
through foreign exchange REPO, and develop a derivatives market.  
Keywords: inflation targeting, consumer price index, exchange rate, monetary policy, Russian ruble, Bank of 
Russia.  
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1. Inflation and inflation expectations in Russia 
The transition to inflation targeting and refusal of direct participation in the formation of the exchange rate, 
which was implemented by the Bank of Russia at the end of 2014, has had mixed results. Their influence sparks 
discussions among experts regarding the achievement of the expected results. Achievement of CPI levels, which 
turned out to be even lower than the target of 4% adopted by the regulator, opens up new questions in the urgent 
problem of inflation targeting. As noted (Kartaev, 2016), a long period of price stability can become a factor in 
the growth of economic agents' confidence in the national currency, which, in turn, will have a positive effect on 
the stability of the exchange rate in the event of external shocks by reducing capital outflow and stabilizing 
investments. That is, price stability should lead to a decrease in inflation expectations, which will become a 
trigger that price and exchange rate stability to shocks. 
However, despite the low rate of price growth over the past three years, inflationary expectations remain at a 
fairly high level. The Bank of Russia in its February report on monetary policy reports that in January 2020, the 
median inflation rate expected by the population over the next 12 months was at 8.3%. The price expectations of 
Russian enterprises were at about 8%. Thus, economic agents, who are the main participants in the pricing 
process, are confident that inflation will be more than twice the Bank of Russia target. And only professional 
analysts are confident that the CPI will be at a level close to the target of the regulator.
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It should be noted that the scientific literature often indicates the possibility of reducing inflation expectations 
due to the real independence of the Central Bank. In (Goryunov, 2015) come to the conclusion that the stability 
of monetary policy is a reliable tool for fixing inflation expectations due to the increase of business confidence in 
the actions of the regulator. The monetary policy of the Bank of Russia since 2015 can hardly be blamed for 
instability or softness, however, it must be admitted that inflation expectations of the population and business 
remain at a very high level. 
The dynamics of the observed and expected inflation, as well as the real consumer price index, demonstrate a 
significant correlation between these variables. However, assessing what is the cause and what is the effect is 
uneasy here. We assume that it is the inflation expectations of the population and enterprises that have an impact 
on the actual indicators of price dynamics. There are two reasons for this. First, the higher the inflation 
expectations of the households, the higher the tier propensity to consume, which increases the demand for goods 
and services; second, it is reasonable to assume that enterprises will strive to increase prices no lower than the 
level that they expect for the economy as a whole. What prevents them from implementing this scenario? Of 
course, the demand for products, which after the crisis of 2014-2015 not restored. The demand is induced, first 
of all, at the expense of a part of the household incomes, which is directed to consumption. However, in recent 
years, the real average monthly salary has been increased at a low rate, for example, in 2019, it grew by 2.9%. 
After the crisis of 2014-2015, the propensity of the household to save significantly increased (Gasanov, 2018), 
which also leads to a decrease in consumer demand. Consumer lending is growing, but its effect on increasing 
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demand is not so high, since high-interest rates reduce the solvency in the future when the loan has to be repaid. 
In addition, the impact of consumer credit is overwhelmingly limited to the imported industrial goods sector. 
Ultimately, the contraction in demand due to low household incomes due to tight budget policy and negative 
expectations of employers, and not the tight monetary policy of the Bank of Russia, have become the main 
factors of low inflation over the past three years. Based on the postulate that only if economic agents have low 
inflationary expectations, the regulator can successfully counter it by monetary methods (Goryunov, 2015), it 
should be assumed that monetary policy measures in the period 2017-2019 were excessively tough. The main 
instrument of monetary policy in the context of inflation targeting, in the role of which is the Central Bank Key 
Rate, cannot exert a significant influence on the CPI under these conditions. 
In the situation of high inflation expectations and insufficient efficiency of the transmission mechanism, 
accompanied by a weak level of development of the financial sector (Goryunov et al., 2015), the efficiency of 
the interest rate channel is low, and increase in interest rates may cause the opposite effect: due to the features of 
the business culture of Russia, an increase of Key Rate is estimated by economic agents as a signal for future 
price increases. Most often, the rise in interest rates is associated with a worsening situation in the foreign 
exchange market. In the absence of the possibility of credit financing, industrial enterprises, taking advantage of 
the rise in import prices, prefer to raise prices rather than grow production volumes, which further enhances 
inflation trends (Glazyev, 2015). 
The percentage channel is not ideal, even in developed economies. From 2007 to the present, the central banks of 
developed countries, especially the US Federal Reserve and the ECB, have emitted incredibly large amounts of 
money. Today practically any bank in Europe and the US can get unlimited liquidity support from regulators. At 
the same time, the ECB cannot achieve inflation. The reason is the same negative economic expectations of end 
consumers - households that are not ready to spend. 
The insignificant influence of interest rates on the CPI (Lomivorotov, 2014) is explained by the presence of non-
monetary inflation factors. The main one is external shocks, which are realized through the exchange rate and the 
dynamics of prices of international exchange commodities. The negative impact of changes in world prices on 
Russian export goods is observed both in the case of an increase in prices for them, and a fall. In the event of an 
increase in prices for exported goods, the disparity between domestic and world prices increases, this, over a 
certain period of time, is compensated by their increase in the national economy. In the event of a fall in prices 
for Russian exports, a depreciation of the ruble is observed, which is also reflected with a certain lag in domestic 
prices: first the pass-through effect on imports, and then, on goods produced domestically, since due to a 
decrease in the dollar cost, they become more competitive in the global market. The dual character of the 
channel of influence of exchange rate fluctuations on inflation is noted in (Mogilat, 2017). 
(Mironov, 2015) rightly points out that targeting the CPI, which contains a high level of imports, can increase 
the pro-cyclical nature of inflation. In a situation where the Key Rate is the main instrument of price stability, in 
the event of devaluation, the regulator is forced to resort to tightening it in those periods when world prices for 
energy resources and other raw materials will decline, and economic agents will especially need support. 
Given the high propensity of households to save, easing monetary policy will not have a significant negative 
effect on consumer prices. A certain tightening of the non-price rules for consumer lending is enough to ensure 
that credit resources do not put pressure on the consumer goods market. Loans that are given by banks to 
business (credit channel loans) is “resource money”, not “consumers money” and will not automatically lead to 
an increase in effective demand, as it is claimed of orthodox macroeconomic theories. 
Nevertheless, the importance of interest rate policy after the imposition of the international sanctions and 
restriction of the access of Russian corporations and banks to the world financial market should increase. The 
reason for the low efficiency of interest rate policy in the period before the crisis of 2014-2015 could be the 
assumption made by (Woodford, 2010), (Hofmann and Bogdanova, 2012), (Andryushin, 2015), that in 
conditions when national financial intermediaries prefer to attract funding from the foreign markets, interest rates 
of the Central Bank don't have a significant impact either on the interbank lending market, or on loans to the real 
sector of the economy, or the macroeconomic situation in the country.  
Proponents of tight monetary policy often refer to the high level of employment and capacity utilization, which 
are an obstacle to investment growth due to lower interest rates (Yudaeva, 2014), (Badasen et al., 2015). Based 
on theoretical assumptions, this seems to be a correct conclusion, but it should be remembered that employment 
in Western economies, the modeling results of which underlie these postulates, and in Russia, are completely 
different phenomena. With relatively low unemployment according to the ILO method in 2017, 26.4% of the 
working population are classified as employed with low wages (they receive less than 2/3 of the median 
earnings), 7.2% are working poor, 10.2% of young people from 15 to 24 years old, neither studies nor works. In 
Russia, there is not a shortage of labor, but highly qualified jobs. Their creation, structural reforms, and 
modernization of the economy, which were set by the goals of the Government (Medvedev, 2015), are 
unrealizable under the tight monetary policy. 
The monetary policy of the Bank of Russia continues to be tight (Balatsky, 2019). This can be seen from the 
level of the Monetization ratio defined as the ratio of the broad money supply to GDP. Let us compare its level 
in the BRICS countries and the individual commodity countries with Russia (Table 1). 
Table 1. Monetization ratio (M2 / GDP), in % 
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018  χ 
Brazil 68 70 76 74 77 79 79 82 88 94 94 96 81 
Russia 43 40 49 51 47 47 51 54 62 59 59 59 52 
India 72 77 79 78 79 77 78 78 78 75 74 74 77 
China 149 149 175 176 175 181 187 192 203 209 204 199 183 
S. Africa 79 81 78 76 75 73 71 71 73 72 72 73 74 
Mexico 26 26 30 31 31 31 33 34 36 38 39 38 33 
Australia 91 98 94 101 100 101 106 109 113 118 116 113 105 
Canada 113 124 nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd 119 
World Bank data 
 
The experience of China is noteworthy here, which skillfully combines a high level of monetization of the 
economy, a controlled exchange rate, and the dynamics of economic growth that is incredible for Russia over the 
long period. In Mexico, which is historically characterized by a low level of monetization of the economy, the 
shortage of the national money supply is compensated by the active circulation of the US dollar in the country. 
In the situation of the crisis associated with the coronavirus pandemic and a new wave of devaluation, Russia 
will face a decline in production and an increase in prices. Therefore, we welcome the downward trend in the 
Key Rate of the Bank of Russia. Consumer prices in the current environment will not depend on the dynamics of 
the Key Rate. In a press release dated March 20, it is noted that “short-term pro-inflationary risks have 
intensified due to a possible more significant exchange rate pass-through effect of the weakening of the ruble 
into prices ... At the same time, a significant weakening of external demand, a possible decrease in consumer 
activity and lag effects from the tightening of monetary policy conditions can be sources of significant 
disinflationary risks in the medium term."
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 Is it possible to count on a positive effect on the Russian CPI due to 
weakening external demand? I imply a weakening of external demand for Russian goods and services, then it is 
worth noting: firstly, Russia produces has too few final consumption goods that are exported, therefore, the 
effect should be expected to be insignificant, if not zero; secondly, due to the devaluation of the ruble, producers 
of these goods will redirect them for export at a discount in dollar prices and earn additional profits. If the Bank 
of Russia implies a weakening of consumer demand in the markets of partner countries, then one should not 
expect that this will lead to a significant decrease in prices for goods and services in these markets. 
The inconsistency of numerous approaches and models that assess the effectiveness of inflation targeting 
necessitates changes. In contrast to the basic concepts of economic policy, the choice of goals in the current 
management of the economy is a tactical element and is subject to change over time and the emergence of new 
challenges. Perhaps the time has come to re-evaluate inflation targeting as the sole goal of the monetary 
authorities. After the crisis of 2008-2009, many authors advocate changing the goals of monetary regulators 
(Frankel, 2012), (Fackler, McMillin, 2020). 
Interest in targeting nominal GDP arose against the backdrop of the crisis in advanced economies. However, in 
(Bhandari, Frankel, 2017) it is argued that developing countries are better suited to such a model in the light of 
large external trade shocks. In inflation targeting, the full impact of adverse shocks is reflected in the loss of real 
GDP. In (Chen, 2020), it is noted that targeting GDP reduces inflation volatility by 25%, fluctuations in 
production by 27%, and, in almost the same way as inflation targeting, stabilizes inflation. 
Summarizing up, it should be noted that it should not be allowed that high-interest rates in the struggle to 
maintain low rates of increase in prices, as one of the factors in the successful development of the economy, 
don't lead to the opposite effect. 
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2. Exchange rate and exchange rate policy 
Over the past five years, the dynamics of the Russian ruble (RUB) exchange rate has been showing relative 
stability; inflation has dropped to record lows. First of all, I would like to express my agreement that the time for 
the transition to the floating rate was not chosen the best. In the autumn of 2014, the monetary conditions were 
as follows: there was a closure of global financial markets for Russia, capital outflows, and the associated 
pressure on the RUB exchange rate. In such conditions, the transition to a free-floating regime is not 
recommended by supporters of regulating the national currency exchange rate (Andryushin, 2015) and as the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS, 2012). Nevertheless, the Bank of Russia decided not to abandon the 
previously adopted plan to switch from January 1, 2015, to a floating regime, in which the geopolitical events of 
2014 were not taken into account. The work (Andryushin, 2014) indicated the likelihood of a sharp devaluation 
of the ruble due to the neglect of the risks of speculative attacks and the lack of clear methods in the regulator's 
plans to neutralize the negative impact of fluctuations in the ruble exchange rate on the national economy. 
In 2015, the RUB exchange rate was not stable. Both the maximum and minimum value of exchange rate 
fluctuations during 2015-2019 is observed precisely from January 2015 to January 2016. The exchange rate 
volatility (defined as a standard deviation) for 2015 is 6.1437 rubles (10.0% of the average annual rate) and for 
during the 2016-2019 – 3.5051 rubles (5.6% of the average annual rate). 
The dynamics of the exchange rate remains a significant factor not only in inflation but also in economic growth. 
Econometric models by most authors indicate the impact of the exchange rate on inflation (pass-through effect) 
and output. In the (Loschenkova, Zaitsev, 2019), the exchange rate is defined as one of the most significant 
factors in the investment attractiveness of the Russian economy. In the (Lomivorotov, 2014) notes that in the 
period 1999-2013, the ruble devaluation by 10% led to an increase in the CPI by 1.5% with a lag of 4-6 months; 
the output increases by 0.5% with a lag of 2-3 months. After the 2014-2015 financial crisis, the pass-through 
effect due to reduced demand factors increased significantly. In the period 2014-2017, the RUB devaluation by 
1% led to an increase in the CPI by 0.18% in the next month and by 0.39% over the next two months (Gasanov, 
Petrosyan, 2018). In the (Sinyakov et al., 2019), the pass-through effect is assessed by sectors of the Russian 
economy. A high pass-through effect is observed in those industries in which pricing is most significant for most 
Russian citizens: agriculture (0.26), food production (0.26), and textile and clothing manufacturing (0.52).  
The dynamics of the international reserves of the Bank of Russia testifies to the fact that a flexible formation of 
the ruble exchange rate has de facto not taken place. Over the past five years, the volume of reserves increased 
by 168.9 billion USD, or 42.8%. Over the last year, 2019 - by 85.9 billion USD or 18.3%. That is, there are 
regular ruble interventions, which should not exist given a freely floating exchange rate (Yudaeva, 2014). How 
to disagree with the opinion (Andryushin, 2015): “this practice has nothing to do with a floating, all the more 
flexible floating, exchange rate” [p. 59]. The ruble exchange rate cannot be called “free-floating” even in the 
context of the Budget Rule. Undoubtedly, the Budget Rule is an effective tool for absorbing high oil and gas 
budget revenues, but from the point of view of currency policy, its implementation is the same foreign exchange 
interventions that stabilize the RUB exchange rate. But these interventions are of a regular unilateral nature - 
they keep the RUB exchange rate low against world reserve currencies. In 2019, the Russian Ministry of Finance 
acquired foreign currency worth 2.977 trillion RUB
3
, which with an average annual exchange rate of 64.62 RUB 
/ USD is equivalent to 46 billion USD. The Bank of Russia should publicly declare the exchange rate policy as 
the de facto one - a floating exchange rate adjusted for unwanted fluctuations, and not at all a free-floating 
exchange rate. 
Moreover, the negative nature of the role of exchange rate volatility on economic growth is regularly confirmed 
by researchers. Exploring the results of empirical studies on the effect of devaluation on GDP dynamics 
(Mironov V., 2015) notes the negative impact of devaluation on economic growth, the likelihood of a financial 
crisis and a decrease in credit ratings, increased uncertainty, and a reduction in investment activity. In (Aghion et 
al, 2009) it is noted that, in contrast to developed economies, where macroeconomic shocks are compensated by 
exchange rate flexibility, in developing economies, on the contrary, financial shocks become the main source of 
macroeconomic instability. Hadj Fraj et al. (2018) found that full exchange rate flexibility significantly 
destabilizes emerging markets and accelerates economic growth in developed countries. They also concluded 
that there is a relationship between the nature of the exchange rate regime and the quality of decision-making in 
monetary management. The paper (Balaban et al, 2019) notes the negative impact of exchange rate volatility on 
overall economic development and foreign direct investment in Central and Eastern European countries.  
                                           
3
 Federal Treasury of the Russian Federation. URL: 
https://roskazna.ru/o-kaznachejstve/plany-i-otchety/o-rezultatakh-raboty-fk 
The findings (Cao et al., 2020) suggest that the choice of exchange rate regime is not a universal solution for all 
countries and cultures. The authors conclud that when establishing optimal exchange rate regimes, one should 
take into account not only economic but also cultural characteristics of countries. If a country's exchange rate 
regime is consistent with its national business culture, economic agents can better accept and adapt to it, leading 
to increased social welfare. 
The high value of the ruble exchange rate for the Russian economy is reported by (Goryunov, 2015), (Amosov, 
2015), etc. Despite the policy of de-dollarization, as of January 1, 2020, 19.1% of Russian banks’ liabilities are 
denominated in foreign currency and the 20 largest banks have 20.6%. International liabilities of corporations 
exceed USD 227.6 billion.
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 In the event of an attack on the ruble, to avoid a sharp devaluation, the regulator can 
and should promptly support the ruble exchange rate, since the preemptive actions will have a stabilizing effect 
and signal the market about the danger of speculative play. Note that we are don't call for keeping the ruble 
exchange rate at a constant, but recommend achieving a reduction in volatility during periods of external shocks. 
By the stability of the exchange rate dynamics, we mean the absence of sharp devaluation (or revaluation, which 
is unlikely) in the ruble exchange rate against the world reserve currencies, which threaten to destabilize the 
financial system and the economy of the country.  
To support the RUB exchange rate during the crises of 2008-2009 and 2014-2015, the Bank of Russia, as the 
main, used two instruments: the foreign exchange interventions and the interest rates. Which tool was most 
effective? Let's turn to the statistics: let's compare the ratio of the loss of foreign exchange reserves and the RUB 
exchange rate against the USD during the crises of 2008-2009 and 2014-2015 (Tables 2a, 2b). The idea of an 
indicator of the ratio of maximum and minimum international reserves is borrowed from (Aizenman, Sun, 2012). 












Max ER / 
Min ER 
595 902 384 074 1,55 35,76 23,35 1,53 
 










Min ER  
(06.14) 
Max ER / 
Min ER 
454 240 356 005 1,28 64,63 34,41 1,88 
Data: Statistical Bulletin of the Bank of Russia.  
Reserves are quoted in billions of USD. 
RUB to USD rate - average monthly official rate of the Bank of Russia. 
 
During the crisis of 2008-2009, the difference between the indicators of loss of reserves and the exchange rate 
was 0.02 (1.5515 - 1.5315), and during the crisis of 2014-2015 minus 0.60 (1.28 - 1.88). The comparison allows 
us to conclude that foreign exchange interventions are important for supporting the RUB. The more reserves are 
spent, the less the RUB losses in the exchange rate. In addition to the calculations also note that the interest rates 
as a tool for managing the stability of the RUB exchange rate don't show so high efficiency: during 2008-2009 
they increased from 11 to 13% (change rate 1.18) and during the 2014-2015 from 7.5 to 17% (change rate 2.27). 
The article (Aizenman, Sun, 2012) concludes that the openness of trade and the financial market plays an 
important role in the accumulation of international reserves as insurance and the need to spend them in large 
volumes during a crisis to compensate for external shocks [p. 255]. With the protracted nature of the crisis after 
several months and the presence of large losses, the regulators fear the loss of reserves, interventions are 
reduced, and the increase of reserves begins. In countries with high export potential, where there is a positive 
trade balance, the post-devaluation accumulation of reserves occurs rather quickly due to a reduction in imports 
of goods and services. With a low level of export-import elasticity (Gurvich, 2013) typical for the Russian 
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economy, the positive effect of devaluation is limited to the raw materials sector, which advantages over the non-
resource economy, which is shocked by rising import prices and reduced investment. 
The experience of the 2014-2015 devaluation shows that for the Russian financial system, interest rates on ruble 
loans haven't still become an effective tool to support the RUB exchange rate during periods of capital outflow 
and an attack on the RUB. With a speculative attack on the ruble, when the yield of foreign exchange 
transactions within a month can reach 50-70%, an increase in money market rates even by 2-3 times will not 
bring the expected effect. And lending to economic agents will stop, including due to the outflow of their liquid 
assets to the foreign exchange market (Glazyev S., 2015). The non-financial business cannot provide profitability 
with interest rates, that exceed its own profitability. Should also take into account the presence of global trends 
in capital outflow and devaluation of currencies of developing countries, when the actions of the regulator should 
go in the same direction with the actions of other regulators or the situation that develops when only the RUB is 
attacked for one reason or another. The regulator must have sufficiently accurate forecasts of the development of 
the situation in the global financial market to assess the situation on time and make the right decisions. 
One of the reasons for the permanent pressure on the ruble exchange rate is the structural imbalances in the 
Russian economy. Nevertheless, in our opinion, the motive for the sharp devaluation in 2014-2015 was, first of 
all, geopolitical problems and sanctions, structural problems of the economy, and the decline in oil prices 
became a triggering mechanism, the effect of which would be moderate. This is evidenced by a comparative 
analysis of the devaluation of the currencies of countries exporting oil and other raw materials. In the period 
from July 2014 to August 2015, the nominal exchange rate of the RUB devalued by 39.4%, and the real effective 
exchange rate - by 29.4%; in the same period, the currencies of Australia, Norway, and Mexico were devalued 
by, respectively: 13.7%, 16.5%, and 16.0%; 11.7%, 11.8 and 14.1% (Mironov, 2015). 
When comparing the dynamics of inflation and the exchange rate of RUB, it turns out that the stability of the 
exchange rate is more important for activating the investment process and domestic consumption. The 
strengthening of the RUB exchange rate has a particularly positive effect on these processes (Ershov, 2015). 
The stabilization of the exchange rate requires the regulator to determine the fundamental exchange rate of the 
ruble to world reserve currencies since the results of studies on the effectiveness of foreign exchange 
interventions indicate that uncertainty about the fundamental value of the exchange rate leads to the fact that 
foreign exchange interventions become less effective. It is also noted that the actions of speculators, under some 
circumstances, can reduce the volatility of the exchange rate, but always support the upward trend in the 
mismatch of the exchange rate with the fundamental, and the intervention of the regulator reduces the volatility 
of the exchange rate and also reduces the risks of speculation. Several authors (Andryushin, 2015), (Glazyev, 
2015) believe that achieving financial and price stability in the Russian economy is possible only by targeting 
the exchange rate. The presence of a target level of the ruble exchange rate can form for economic agents the 
expectations of the dynamics of this exchange rate desired for the regulator. It is known that in emerging 
markets, the expectations of foreign exchange market participants that correlate with the policy of the regulator 
allow it to set the desired vector of exchange rate dynamics with the help of minor interventions (Miyajima, 
2013). 
Anyway, all regulators strive to create favorable conditions for their residents at the expense of the 
undervaluation of the exchange rate, resorting to the so-called “modern mercantilism”. In this desire, it is 
necessary to find an acceptable level of the RUB exchange rate for all participants in economic relations, and 
don't blame other countries, so spoke (Medvedev, 2015), as prime minister. In order not to be unfounded, let us 
turn to a comparative analysis of the ratio of purchasing power parity (PPP) and the nominal exchange rate 
calculated in the national currencies of several countries with which Russia is most often compared or has a 
similar export structure (Table 3). 
Table 3. PPP / Nominal exchange rate Ratio (to the USD, in %)  
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Brazil 58 66 65 79 88 80 76 74 56 57 63 55 53 
Russia 55 58 44 52 59 60 61 55 39 36 42 41 40 
India 28 27 27 31 32 29 28 28 26 26 28 26 26 
China 39 46 46 49 54 56 57 57 56 52 52 54 51 
S. Africa 54 49 51 62 66 60 53 49 43 40 46 47 44 
Mexico 67 67 55 61 62 60 62 61 53 47 48 49 48 
Australia 112 132 106 132 149 159 148 133 123 106 109 111 102 
Canada 113 116 105 119 125 125 119 111 98 94 96 96 90 
Data: World Bank Group 
 
All developing countries take advantage of the undervalued national currencies. Only highly developed 
economies, despite the raw material nature of their exports, can afford to have a currency whose nominal 
exchange rate is as close as possible to PPP or sometimes higher it is. At the end of 2019, the average annual 
exchange rate of the Russian ruble in comparison with PPP is undervalued by 2.54 times! The smallest (best) 
result is observed at the end of 2013 - 1.64 times). Of the BRICS countries, only the national currency of India is 
undervalued more than the Russian ruble. But India traditionally had a negative current payment account. The 
data on the dynamics of the PPP of the Russian ruble does not allow us to agree with the conclusion that the 
weakening of the regulatory influence of the Central Bank is a prerequisite for the reduction of the disparity 
between the PPP and the nominal market rate (Kiyutsevskaya, 2014). During the entire period after the 
introduction of the “floating rate” regime, there has been an increase in the gap between the nominal market rate 
and PPP. Until 2014, the opposite process is observed (except 2009). The presented data also allow us to 
conclude that there is no positive effect of high disparity on the likelihood of subsequent devaluations: before the 
devaluation of 2008-2009, the disparity was 1.73 times, the devaluation of the RUB was 53% of the values of 
July 2008, before the devaluation of 2014-2015 the disparity was 1.83 times, the devaluation of the RUB reached 
88% of the values of June 2014. 
Monetary mercantilism, which means the practice of accumulating foreign exchange reserves to maintain a low 
level of the national currency rate to stimulate export-oriented industries (Narkevich, 2015), (Loshchenkova, 
Zaitsev, 2019) is suitable for those economies that produce industrial goods for sale in highly competitive 
markets. Russian exports consist mainly of commodities, prices for which are forming on the international 
exchange markets, and over-the-counter markets for these goods are not always regulated on the principles of 
open competition (example, the OPEC +). The country is facing the implementation of the tasks of structural 
changes in the economy. In the context of the need to increase the share of non-resource exports for the Russian 
economy, financial mercantilism based on selective economic policy is more suitable. In the conditions of 
financial mercantilism, it is practiced to finance target industries and create favorable conditions for them to 
attract capital both in the domestic and foreign markets. It should be noted here that the scientific literature often 
asserts the impossibility of effective selective policy in countries with a high level of corruption (Mironov, 
2015). But this topic is outside the scope of our research. 
One cannot unequivocally agree with the statements about the impossibility of monetary stimulation of the 
economy in the presence of structural problems (Yudaeva, 2014), (Badasen et al., 2015). The availability of 
credit and the stability of the exchange rate can have a stimulating effect on investment by both domestic and 
foreign economic agents. The stable and predictable in the long term the exchange rate of the national currency 
reduces the risks of an investment in new projects in two directions: (1) the availability of procurement of 
imported equipment and technologies, as well as confidence in the repayment of foreign currency loans received 
for their purchase; (2) the absence of significant risks of the exchange rate dynamics, which contributes to the 
free repatriation of profits for foreign investors. 
And finally, a study (Chen, Lee, 2018) confirms the hypothesis that in the long term for commodity economies 
only the presence of market power in world commodity trade can reduce the reaction of the exchange rate of the 
national currency, and in the short term, the inflation targeting regime can strengthen the reactions of the 
exchange rate for fluctuations in commodity prices. The authors also point to the need for foreign exchange 
interventions to counter excessive fluctuations in commodity currencies. 
  
3. Discussion 
The need for targeting the exchange rate follows from a completely fair postulate: “economic policy is not 
neutral about economic interests” (Glazyev, 2014). The RUB will always need support due to the unequal 
financial potentials of interested stakeholders: importers, whose financial and business resources are 
incommensurately small, are playing against the foreign exchange interests of hydrocarbon and metallurgical 
giants with their colossal influence don't only on the financial market, but also on all levels of the Russian 
government, which are always “for” devaluation. Therefore, direct support through foreign exchange 
interventions should remain, albeit the last tool that should be resorted to without fear of losing international 
reserves, since their existence is justified by such a necessity. 
When setting money market rates, the deceptiveness of negative real rates due to inflationary surges caused by 
devaluation should be avoided; it is obvious that the rise in prices caused by a sharp rise in the price of imports 
(pass-through effect) has nothing to do with interest rates in the domestic market and can't be controlled with 
their help. 
The effectiveness of the transmission mechanism is a factor determining the effectiveness of the monetary 
policy. The main problem of the transmission of actions (signals) of the Bank of Russia is the underdevelopment 
of the financial sector. Is the requirement for the development of the financial market should go beyond the 
requirements for the banking system, which over the past five years has significantly improved the time structure 
of assets and liabilities, increase the capital and the regulator has increased the level of monitoring of the banking 
system. Activity are needed to stimulate economic agents to hedge the financial risks, primarily the currency 
risks. Corporate structures can be indirectly influenced through public procurement. It is enough to introduce a 
requirement for the obligatory hedging of foreign exchange risks when participating in the supply of products, 
the prices of which are related to exchange rate fluctuations. The increase of the RUB derivatives market, the 
lower the volatility of the RUB will become. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The instability of the global financial market creates conditions for the penetration of external shocks into the 
Russian market. In contrast to previous crises, several necessary measures to help the Russian financial market 
maintain stability have already been implemented. In particular, the regulator carefully monitors foreign 
exchange risks of domestic banks, the time structure of liabilities and assets, which reduces sensitivity to sharp 
fluctuations in the RUB exchange rate and interest rates. However, in the event of severe shocks caused by the 
movement of speculative capital, the inflow and especially the outflow of international capital may be of such 
volumes that the stability of the ruble exchange rate will be disturbed. In such cases, must use the “Budget Rule” 
in the opposite direction. That is, the Ministry of Finance of Russia must sell foreign currency from reserves in 
the amount that compensates for the current budget revenues that fall due to the fall in oil prices below the level 
established by the "Budget Rule". This will allow maintaining the current stability of the budget and supporting 
the RUB for a sharp fall. 
When the ruble exchange rate reaches a level that a fall below which threatens financial stability, the Bank of 
Russia should abandon the allocation of ruble liquidity, which will appear on the foreign exchange market, and 
give liquidity for banks once in foreign currency (in the form of foreign exchange REPO). This tactic will allow 
supporting the liquidity of banks (yes, with losses for them) and the exchange rate at the same time. When the 
market stabilizes, the use of this tool should stop to avoid the negative consequences described in (Glazyev, 
2015). 
The world is increasingly faced with a non-standard reaction of economic agents to the policy of the monetary 
authorities. The current events caused by the coronavirus pandemic may be another factor that will accelerate the 
official adoption by the monetary regulators of developed countries of an additional goal - economic growth. 
Taking into account the anomalies of monetary regulation, typical of the world economy in the last decade, there 
is a request to study the influence of behavioral factors of economic agents on the dynamics of inflation, 
currency fluctuations, and economic growth. 
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